UA Part 15: Safety - Annex B (informative)Additional information

Annex B (informative)Additional information

B.1 CRC-calculation using tables, for the polynomial 0xF4ACFB13

The calculation of a 32-bit CRC signature over an array of N bytes with the help of lookup tables, using “C” as programming language, is shown below:

// VARIANT A: presumably easier to implement on little endian machines uint32_t crctab32[256]; // lookup table uint32_t CRC32_Backward(char *array, int16_t N){ // input is array of N bytes // containing the data, see Figure 20 uint32_t result = 1; // seed value for the calculated CRC-signature int16_t i; // index for(i=N-1;i>=0;i--) // process array in reversed order result = crctab32 [((result >> 24) ^ array[i]) & 0xff] ^ (result << 8); if (result==0) return 1;else return result; }

where the lookup-table crctab32 has to be initialized as shown in Table B.1.

// VARIANT B: presumably easier to implement on big endian machines uint32_t crctab32[256]; // lookup table uint32_t CRC32_Forward(char *array, int16_t N){ // input is array of N bytes // containing the data in reversed // order, see e. g. Figure 21 uint32_t result = 1; // seed value for the calculated CRC-signature int16_t i; // index for(i=0;i<N;i++) // process array result = crctab32 [((result >> 24) ^ array[i]) & 0xff] ^ (result << 8); if (result==0) return 1;else return result; }

where the lookup-table crctab32 has to be initialized as shown in Table B.1.

Table B.1 – The CRC32 lookup table for 32-bit CRC signature calculations

CRC32 lookup table (0 to 255)
00000000	F4ACFB13	1DF50D35	E959F626	3BEA1A6A	CF46E179	261F175F	D2B3EC4C
77D434D4	8378CFC7	6A2139E1	9E8DC2F2	4C3E2EBE	B892D5AD	51CB238B	A567D898
EFA869A8	1B0492BB	F25D649D	06F19F8E	D44273C2	20EE88D1	C9B77EF7	3D1B85E4
987C5D7C	6CD0A66F	85895049	7125AB5A	A3964716	573ABC05	BE634A23	4ACFB130
2BFC2843	DF50D350	36092576	C2A5DE65	10163229	E4BAC93A	0DE33F1C	F94FC40F
5C281C97	A884E784	41DD11A2	B571EAB1	67C206FD	936EFDEE	7A370BC8	8E9BF0DB
C45441EB	30F8BAF8	D9A14CDE	2D0DB7CD	FFBE5B81	0B12A092	E24B56B4	16E7ADA7
B380753F	472C8E2C	AE75780A	5AD98319	886A6F55	7CC69446	959F6260	61339973
57F85086	A354AB95	4A0D5DB3	BEA1A6A0	6C124AEC	98BEB1FF	71E747D9	854BBCCA
202C6452	D4809F41	3DD96967	C9759274	1BC67E38	EF6A852B	0633730D	F29F881E
B850392E	4CFCC23D	A5A5341B	5109CF08	83BA2344	7716D857	9E4F2E71	6AE3D562
CF840DFA	3B28F6E9	D27100CF	26DDFBDC	F46E1790	00C2EC83	E99B1AA5	1D37E1B6
7C0478C5	88A883D6	61F175F0	955D8EE3	47EE62AF	B34299BC	5A1B6F9A	AEB79489
0BD04C11	FF7CB702	16254124	E289BA37	303A567B	C496AD68	2DCF5B4E	D963A05D
93AC116D	6700EA7E	8E591C58	7AF5E74B	A8460B07	5CEAF014	B5B30632	411FFD21
E47825B9	10D4DEAA	F98D288C	0D21D39F	DF923FD3	2B3EC4C0	C26732E6	36CBC9F5
AFF0A10C	5B5C5A1F	B205AC39	46A9572A	941ABB66	60B64075	89EFB653	7D434D40
D82495D8	2C886ECB	C5D198ED	317D63FE	E3CE8FB2	176274A1	FE3B8287	0A977994
4058C8A4	B4F433B7	5DADC591	A9013E82	7BB2D2CE	8F1E29DD	6647DFFB	92EB24E8
378CFC70	C3200763	2A79F145	DED50A56	0C66E61A	F8CA1D09	1193EB2F	E53F103C
840C894F	70A0725C	99F9847A	6D557F69	BFE69325	4B4A6836	A2139E10	56BF6503
F3D8BD9B	07744688	EE2DB0AE	1A814BBD	C832A7F1	3C9E5CE2	D5C7AAC4	216B51D7
6BA4E0E7	9F081BF4	7651EDD2	82FD16C1	504EFA8D	A4E2019E	4DBBF7B8	B9170CAB
1C70D433	E8DC2F20	0185D906	F5292215	279ACE59	D336354A	3A6FC36C	CEC3387F
F808F18A	0CA40A99	E5FDFCBF	115107AC	C3E2EBE0	374E10F3	DE17E6D5	2ABB1DC6
8FDCC55E	7B703E4D	9229C86B	66853378	B436DF34	409A2427	A9C3D201	5D6F2912
17A09822	E30C6331	0A559517	FEF96E04	2C4A8248	D8E6795B	31BF8F7D	C513746E
6074ACF6	94D857E5	7D81A1C3	892D5AD0	5B9EB69C	AF324D8F	466BBBA9	B2C740BA
D3F4D9C9	275822DA	CE01D4FC	3AAD2FEF	E81EC3A3	1CB238B0	F5EBCE96	01473585
A420ED1D	508C160E	B9D5E028	4D791B3B	9FCAF777	6B660C64	823FFA42	76930151
3C5CB061	C8F04B72	21A9BD54	D5054647	07B6AA0B	F31A5118	1A43A73E	EEEF5C2D
4B8884B5	BF247FA6	567D8980	A2D17293	70629EDF	84CE65CC	6D9793EA	993B68F9
This table contains 32-bit values in hexadecimal representation for each value (0 to 255) of the argument a in the function crctab32 [a]. The table should be used line-by-line in ascending order from top left (0) to bottom right (255). For instance, crctab32[10] is highlighted using a darker background and red color.

B.2 Use cases

B.2.1 Unidirectional communication

The most basic type of communication is unidirectional communication, where a safety application on one device (Figure 29: Controller A) sends data to a safety application on another device (Figure 29: Controller B).

Figure 29 – Unidirectional Communication

This is accomplished by placing a SafetyProvider on Controller A and a SafetyConsumer on Controller B. The connection between SafetyProvider and SafetyConsumer can be established and terminated during runtime, allowing different consumers to connect to the same SafetyProvider at different times. Furthermore, the protocol is designed in such a way, that the SafetyConsumer needs to know the parametrized set of IDs of the SafetyProvider such that it is able to safely check whether the received data is coming from the expected source. On the other hand, as safety data flows in one direction only, there is no need for the SafetyProvider to check the ID of the SafetyConsumers. Hence, Controller A can – one after another – serve an arbitrarily large number of SafetyConsumers, and new SafetyConsumers can be introduced into the system without having to update controller A.

B.2.2 Bidirectional communication

Bidirectional communication means the exchange of data in both directions, which is accomplished by placing a SafetyProvider and a SafetyConsumer on each controller. Hence, bidirectional communication is realized using two safety connections according to this document.

Figure 30 – Bidirectional Communication

NOTE Connections can be established and terminated during runtime.

B.2.3 Safety Multicast

Multicast is defined as sending the same set of data from one device (Controller A) to several other devices (Controller B1, B2,…,BN) simultaneously.

Figure 31 – Safety Multicast

Safety multicast is accomplished by placing multiple SafetyProviders on Controller A, and one SafetyConsumer on each of the Controllers B1, B2, … BN. Each of the SafetyProviders running on Controller A is connecting to one of the SafetyConsumers running on one of the Controllers B1, B2, … BN.

The safety protocol in this document is designed in such a way that:

the state machine of the SafetyProvider has a low number of states, and thus very low memory demands,
all safety-related message-checks are executed on the consumer and thus the computational demand on the SafetyProvider is low.

Therefore, even if many SafetyProviders are instantiated on a device, the performance requirements will still be moderate.

The properties of simple unicast are also valid for safety multicast; different sets of consumers can connect to SafetyProviders at different times, and new SafetyConsumers can be introduced into the system without having to reconfigure the SafetyProvider instances. As all SafetyProvider instances send the same safety application data (the same data source), it is irrelevant from a safety point of view to which SafetyProvider instance a given SafetyConsumer is connected. Thus, all SafetyProvider instances can be parametrized with the same set of IDs for the SafetyProvider.

B.3 Use cases for Operator Acknowledgment

B.3.1 Explanation

This document supports Operator Acknowledgment both on the SafetyProvider side and on the SafetyConsumer side. For this purpose, both the interface of the SafetyProvider and the SafetyConsumer comprise a Boolean input called OperatorAckProvider and OperatorAckConsumer, respectively. The safety application can get the values of these parameters on the consumer side via the Boolean outputs OperatorAckRequested and OperatorAckProvider on the SafetyConsumers SAPI (see 6.3.4.2).

The following clauses show some examples on how to use these inputs and outputs. Dashed lines indicate that the corresponding input or output is not used in the use case. For details, see 6.3.3 and 6.3.4.

B.3.2 Use case 1: unidirectional comm. and OA on the SafetyConsumer side

Figure B.1 – OA in unidirectional safety communication

In the scenario shown in Figure B., operator acknowledgment must be done on the SafetyConsumer side, operator acknowledgment on the SafetyProvider side is not possible.

B.3.3 Use case 2: bidirectional comm. and dual OA

Figure B.2 – Two-sided OA in bidirectional safety communication

In the scenario shown in Figure B.2, operator acknowledgment is done independently for both directions.

B.3.4 Use case 3: bidirectional comm. and single, one-sided OA

Figure B.3 – One sided OA in bidirectional safety communication

In the scenario of Figure B.3, an operator acknowledgment activated at controller A suffices for re-establishing the bidirectional connection. Both sides will cease delivering fail-safe values and continue sending process values. This is accomplished by connecting OperatorAckProvider with OperatorAckConsumer at the SafetyConsumer of controller B. Activating operator acknowledgment at controller B is not possible in this scenario.

B.3.5 Use case 4: bidirectional comm. and single, two-sided OA

Figure B.4 – One sided OA on each side is possible

Figure B.4 shows a scenario where an operator acknowledgment activated at controller A or controller B suffices for re-establishing the bidirectional connection. Both sides will cease delivering fail-safe values and continue sending process values. This is accomplished by the logic circuits shown in the safety applications.

Bibliography

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Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen (AIS) 20, Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for physical random number generators. Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), 1999.

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